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Tax Treaties

TAX TRJ~i\TIES: TRANSFERRJNG TAXES IN A GLOBAL
ECOi'OMY
BY RY.\N \'\'000 1

I.

INTRODUCTION

n the 1990s, Congress passed legislation that currently affects
transactions between a parent company and its foreign subsidiary,
also known as a transfer pricing transaction. This legislation
prevented international companies from illegally circumventing U.S.
laws and evading income taxes rightfully owed to the U.S. government.
Concurrently, the world economy enjoyed success and companies'
financial statements proved it. Despite staggering profits, many
multinational companies wanting even more income found a subtle
break in the tax code which allows d1em to pay very little in federal
income taxes. For example, in 1998, General l\Iotors Corporation
reported a staggering $4.61 billion in pretax income; however, the auto
maker owed just $36 million or just 0.8 percent of its global pre-tax
income, and of that $36 million, General Motors paid only 13 percent
or $4.68 million to the United States tax collectors.2 According
to section 11 of the I nternal Revenue Code, if a corporation's
taxable income is greater than $10,000,000 the minimum income
tax percentage is at least 35 percent.3 If the 35 percent burden rate
was applied to General Motors's pretax income, then it should have
paid the U.S. government $1.6 billion in taxes instead of just $4.68
million. Similarly, 1\lotorola I ncorporated is in the middle of transfer
pricing tax disputes with the Internal Revenue Service (lRS) for a sum
of $800 miJJjon in back taxes due to same misuse of transfer pricing
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aJso practiced br GLnual Motors.4 ThesL companies employed an
income tax scheme calk·J transfer pricing among their multinational
subsidiaries that was not only dynamic, but legal to a certain extent.
An explanation of transfer pricing and its loopholes prior
to the reYisions in thl! United States tax code will be presented.
Fnrthermore, tax code revisions from the 1990s will be explored
including their benefits as well as their deliciency in establishing
equality for global commerce. Critics asscn that rhc current state
of international tax treaties is sufficient 10 alJe, iating multinational
corporations from double ta.xation and in securing corporate income
taxes for the appropriate gO\·ernmenL On rhe other hand, opponentS
of big business argue that loopholes in the current tax code still exist
and further regulations should be instituted. \X 'hile multinational
corporations must be fairly taxed for all business transactions with
their foreign subsidhtrics, they must not be suppressed through
exorbitant doublc..: taxes in both the United States and abroad. This
equilibrium is best attained through the utilization of further crossborder transfer price recognition, or tax treaties, among countries.

II. TR. \l'~FrR PRICI!'\G

LooPIIOI.I ;s

Transfer pricing "occurs when a pan::nt company sells a product
below or above the market prices to its affiliate to reduce ta.'{es or strip
profits from one company to another." 5Julian I leslop, the chief financial
officer of the British Pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline, called
"transfer-pricing disputes among the toughest issues for corporations
to resoh-e with ta.x authorirics."6 Since there is no market price "ithin
a company it is difficult to establish a reasonable price threshold.- One
4
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advantage to the parent company is that implementing the strategy "can
reduce its reported U.S. income - and increase its subsidiary's profit."H
In essence, transfer pricing is a creative way of disbursing costs and
profits among scattered business subsidiaries within a multinational
company. Since the amount of income tax that a corporation pays
is proportional to the amount of taxable income it earns, increasing
transfer prices from a subsidiary and to its parent will result in a
lower amount of taxable income, and consequently, a lower amount
of taxes owed by the subsidiary.'' By strategically attributing costs and
profits to the appropriate business segment through transfer pricing,
multinational businesses are able to generate substantial tax savings.
Before adopting new transfer pricing legislation, companies'
profits were unjusdr inflated through exploitation of loopholes in
the United States tax code. For example, Symantec Corporation
owns Veritas Software Corporation in Ireland and began paying
large Licensing fees in 2005 to its Irish subsidiary where the corporate
income tax rate is significantly lower than in the United States. During
the course of operations, Symantec's financial officers realized that if
they could pay large licensing fees, they could increase "the income
of the subsidiary in Ireland - a lower-tax country - at the expense
of income in the United States, lowering the company's overall
tax biU." 10 By using this ingenious tax-planning scheme, Symantec
Corporation was able to display a healthy profit by its Irish subsidiary
and reduce its income tax liability in the United States parent company.
Transfer pricing merits investigation because understanding
how companies exploit it as a tax loophole will preclude multinational
companies from evading federal income taxes and from deceiving
potential investors. In 1999, Heiko Thieme, a columnist for the IVai/
Street Jot~mal, dealt with reducing the tax burden on foreign companies
that own subsidiary business segments here in the United States. When
considering national tax reform, Thieme said "to stimulate and not
to discourage should be the philosophy toward corporations and
8
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indi,·idual investors alike." 11 Since investors use financial statements
of multinational companies to make investment decisions, transfer
pricing should not unjustly inflated companies' financial statements. As
a case in point, a 1998 tax study showed a $35.6 billion loss in federal
revenue in that fiscal year. "Through anonymous customs records, the
researchers found $18,000 dot-matrix printers being imported from
Japan and $2,600 radial tires corning from Indonesia.''12 In addition, they
discovered someone "exporting $12,000 helicopters to ltaly and $135
howitzers to South Africa." 13 These previous figures represent blatant
transfer pricing exaggeration between multinatio nal companies and
their foreign subsidiaries. The eYidence against multinational companies
necessi tated new pragmatic tax laws in order to ptevent multinational
companies from evading taxes owed to d1e federal government.
Before 1990, the tax code required companies that used
transfer pricing for products and services to provide only a calculation
of how the transfer price was determined. This left the burden of
actualizing calculations w the IRS. 14 In addition, the IRS used a
tangible asset transfer price threshold between SO percent less than
and 200 percent more than the market price. 15 E rrors in adjustment
that exceed $5,000 are subject w investigation. 16 In a case between
Yukos Oil Securities, a Russian oil company, and the United States
District Court of Southern New York, the Russian Tax Office gave
a summary of previous litigation, including an accusation of transfer
pricing inflation. According to Russian tax law, a transfer price is too
large if it is outside the threshold of 20 percent rhe market price
for the tangible asset. The defendant's tax strategy did not violate
Russian Federal Tax Code. P I n the United States, this transfer price
issue would have been irrelevant due to d1e freedom that the U.S. tax
11
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code accorded to multinational corporations at that time; the old tax
code was too lax on corporations that embellished transfer prices and
their taxable income to countries with lower corporate taxes. The
IRS had the power to levy fines, but these fines were not sufficient
enough to deter multinational companies from abusing transfer
pricing. roreign subsidiaries and their u.s. parent companies ha"e
taken advantage of the inherent enigmatic nature of prc\·ious tax la\\~

Ill. TAX CODE R EVISIONS
Throughout the 1990s changes in transfer pricing regulation
assigned and tightened corporate cost-sharing arrangements; the
government forces companies to evaluate intangible assets as if the
parent company had sold them to an unrelated company, ensuring
that both the buyer and the seller remain free to pu t·sue their own
interests. 18 In his book, Tra11sjer Pticing Under US L:mJ--The Ne1v Regime,
John l\lcDerrmot outlines the evolution of section 482 of the tax code
with respect to transfer pricing. In 1986, Congress commissioned the
IRS to analyze Section 482 of the U.S. tax code and make appropriate
recommendations in order to close tax loopholes found therein.
Subsquently, in 1992, Congress incorporated the TRS's incomebased method for determining the transfer price of "high-profit"
intangible assets into the U.S. tax code. In the new income-based
approach, the value of tangible and intangible assets is proportional
tO the amount of income the asset generates. Later in 1993, the
proposed final regulations took precedence over the majority of
previous regulations, taking effect in October 1994. The regulations
focus on the following alternative price methods: income, comparable
uncontrolled transactions, and other factors. This 1994 addition is
classified as the "best method" rule. Its aim is to produce the most
reliable measure of an arm's length result or market-place value. 19
18
Rob Wells, Moving the Market: IRS Plans Cost-Sharing RLtlcs, Wall St. J.,
Aug. 25, 2005, at C3.
19
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As pn.:' iously discussed, the Cn.ited States re\'oluuonized ics
corporate cost-sharing arrangements and thus Jed the way toward a new
me )del of dispute resolution for transferpricingamong foreign countries.
This stream of legislation during the 1990s led to the creation of the
AdYanced Pnce Agreement or APA program. The AP,\ process is an
alternari,·e co the standard ra_xpayer path of completing-transactions,
filing a rerum, facing audit (some Je,·el of auclit is more likelr with
Jarger taxpayers), and possible appeal with settlement or litigation. The
general requirements of an APA comprise the following: an indication
of the currency used for transactions, starutory proYisions, tax treaties,
court decisions, regulations, and reYenue rulings o r procedures. 211 The
taxpayer initimes the APA process by approaching the IRS (and rypicaJiy
lhe corresponding tax authorities in the other relevant jurisdictions)
before engaging in the related party transactions potentially at issue.
At this point, lhe taxpayer voluntarily provides detailed information to
the governments regarding its business activities, plans, competitors,
market conditions, and prior tax circumstances. The critical piece of
this presentation is the taxpayer's explanation of his o r her planned
pricing method. FoUowing discussion and negotiation, tl1e parries
hopefulJ) reach agreement on how the taxpayer should handle the
pricing of these anticipated related party transactions. Furthermore,
the IRS may nm,· le"y a penahy from 20 to 40 percent of the transfer
price, in addition co back taxes commensurate with the infringement,
when the infraction results in a "gross yaJuation misstatement" in
order to discourage further exploitation of transfer pricing laws.11 Yer,
if companies can show they made a good-faith effort to fo rmulate
a reasonable transfer price, the lRS will avoid attributing a penalry.21
Although these new regulations to the tax CCidc effectively
inhibit companies from e\'ading taxes they owe on tangible assets, it
is still dirficult co regulate tl1e transfer price a company assigns to its
intangible assets. The new tax code addresses abuses in the valuation
20
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of intangible assets such as brand names, patents, and research and
development costs that a company assigns to its products. For example,
the value of a French research team would be considered a pre-existing
intangible asset; others who purchase the drug that the research team
developed, including a subsidiary company, would have to buy the
asset at a price that includes the cost of the french research team:B
Some may argue the new transfer pricing rules are more effecti\'e than
those preceding them; however, it is still impossible to assign a value
to intangible assets that are im·olved in transactions between foreign
subsidiaries and their parent companies. Assigning a price to a new
and reYolutionary product can be clifficult. Nevertheless, the new
code includes spedfic valuation methods permitting a more accurate
transfer ptice assignment to innm·ative intangible assets. For example,
prior to the new transfer pricing regulations U.S.-based multinationals
recurrently developed a patent for a valuable drug in the United States.
After they concluded that the drug would be a worldwide winner,
they would confer the patent to an offshore affiliate. 24 The new code
requires a comparison of the patent's transfer price to a similar patent's
transfer price. In order for the intangible asset to be comparable, one
of the following conditions must be met so that the intangible asset is
comparable: both must be in rhe same general industry, both must haYe a
similar profit margin, or both must be used in the same general process.-~ 5
Even if the company takes a somewhat liberal approach to
determine the transfer price for a revolutionary intangible asset for
which no comparable products exist, the lRS will avoid levying a
penalty if the company has documented research used in calcuL'lting
the transfer price.26 The IRS's new valuation method is not only
dynamic but progressive because it allows companies to estimate
when creating a transfer price for an intangible asset that may have
23
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24
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25
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never before existed. Opponents of this type of valuation system
might argue it accords too much liberty to multinational companies
when determining a transfer price. HoweYer, the transfer pricing
study that the lRS requires measures an intangible asset, which is
often unique in purpose, and therefore any efforts made to determine
its price are better than none at all. 1f this new law on intangible
asset valuation were not in place, multinational corporations in the
United States would still be exploiting loopholes in the tax code and
grossly understating their taxable income. Although they are more
difficult to valuate because of the new tax code, a corporation's
intangible assets are subjected to more scrutiny than in the past.

IV

us TA."< PROGRESS

The rRS is fighting the battle against multinational
corporations who have misused transfer pricing in the past, evidenced
by their recent out-of-court settlement with GlaxoSmithKline PLC,
a pharmaceutical company based in the United Kingdom, and its
United States subsidiary. Glaxo v. Commissioner was originally filed
in 1992 when "the Commissioner began an examination of Glaxo's
tax returns for 1989 and 1990,"27 and the parties settled out of court
in February 2006 in light of the new ameliorations in the U.S. tax
code concerning intangible assets being traded at "arm's length"
between parent companies and their subsidiaries. The case was the
largest transfer price tax case in U.S. history and highlighted the IRS's
new-found resolve to crack down on transfer pricing offenders by
proving that Glaxo's United States subsidiary had grossly overpaid
its British parent for drugs, significantly reducing its rax bill The
settlement constitutes $3.4 billion including back taxes owed and
also a 40 percent penalty based on the total amount of back taxes.
1\Iany contest that the performance of the IRS's prosecuting
attorneys was negligible despite tl1eir utilization of the new tax laws.
Philip R. West, a tax partner at \'\'ashington law firm Steptoe & Johnson
27 GlaxoSmithKline lloldings (Am.) Inc. v. Comm'r, 117 T.C. l, 2 (2001).
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stated "over the past ten to twenty years, the government has brought
a good number of transfer-pricing cases and come away ,,·ith clear
victories in very few of them." 28 Leon Harris a tax expert from Ernst
& Young Multinational pointed out that transfer price cases litigated
against Asian corporations in the 1980s did not succeed.2'> 1r is important
to note the majority of transfer price cases settle out of court anJ
therefore are not prone to have a clear·cutvictory for either side. In spite
of all this, the IRS is confident that with the new tax code it can win Lhe
majority of transfer price cases it will litigate against major corporations
in the future. With respect to the Glaxo case, IRS Commissioner Mark
Everson said, "The settlement of this case sends a strong message of
our resolve to continue to deal with this issue." 30 Clearly, the lRS has
begun to be victorious in litigating and reaching favorable settlements
against multinational corporations who have exploited transfer
pricing loopholes because of the tax code's re·vision during the 1990s.

v F UTURE P ROGRESS NEEDED
The U.S. ta..-x code must continue its strict regulation of
multinational companies' transfer prices, without suffocating them
tluough excessive double-taxes in both the United States and in the
subsicliary's country. Some believe it would be more beneficial for the
United States to isolate itself from foreign competition by levying
high taxes on foreign multinational companies which employ transfer
pricing. \'\'hile this belief is con\'incing, it is not entirely based on
facts. When the IRS issued its new regulations requiring subsidiaries'
transactions to be at "arm's length," many multinational companies
started shifting their inter-company transfer p rices in favo r of the
United States at the expense of tl1e treasur.ies from their native
countries. This was harmful to fo reign economies because foreign
subsidiaries shifted an unequal portion of their profits toward their
28
29
at 18.
30
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parent companies in the Uruted States.31 Consequently, most first
world countries have deYeloped their own transfer pricing regulations
in order to prevent their respective multinational companies from
unjustly reducing their taxable income, whkh reduces the amount of
income tax the company will pay to its respective government.32 These
circumstances create a bothersome situation fo r subsidiaries and
their parent company in ali countries, called double-taxation, which
exposes multinational companies to taxes in both the subsidiary's
counu·y and the parent's country. This is especially detrimental to
the U.S. economy because it has traditionally possessed a 35 percent
corporate income tax rate which impedes growth in multinational
companies, and therefore creates a serious incentiYe for multinational
corporations to leave d1e country with the highest tax burden.33
1n the United States, when the 1RS adopted its 1990 tax code
revisions it also proliferated the international transfer price doubl.etaxation cliJemma. Fortunately, the U nited Stares has addressed this
problem with other coumries by initiating cross-border transfer
price recogrlition, also called "tax treaties." Tax treaties are conceived
for the following two reasons: to avoid double taxation by the two
treaty countries of the income of a resident of either country, and
to prevent the fiscal evasion of either company to its respective
country.3* In addition, tax treaties "also serve a third purpose, the
reciprocal reduction of tax impedin1ents co cross border investment
and trade." 35 In her article published in the New York Uruversity
Law Review, Dr. Ruth i\lason stated that tax treaties help combat tax
avoidance through exchange of information among multinadonals
31
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32
!d.
33
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34
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35
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and their respective countries. In order to promote these causes, tax
treaties stipulate that if the parent company's country to which the
asset is sold recognizes the tax already paid by the subsidiary to its
respective country, then the parent company avoids double taxation. Y>
Tax treaties "include provisions intended to ensure that cross-border
investors do not suffer discrimination in the application of the tax laws
of the other country."37 Ta.-x treaties benefit both countries that use
them because they determine where transfer price penalties are paid
if an infraction does occur, with respect to both countries' tax laws.
AJthough many tax treaties exist with a large number of foreign
countries, the United States must endeavor to establish tax treaties
with groups of associated foreign countries and unions in order to
maximize economic gains by foreign governments and their businesses.
In a case study published in the Brookb'11 f...aJJJ Ret'iell', Professor Allison
Christians, who does not endorse tax treaties, states that the Unjted
States has not yet enacted tax treaties with every foreign country:
Not all countries have tax treaties, and no country
has tax treaties with all the other countries of the
world. The average individual tax treaty network
comprises just 17 treaty partners, and over half of all
countries have tax treaty networks of five or fewer
treaty partners. Jn addition, the benefits of treaties are
typically limited to activities conducted between the
two signatory countries. As a result, there would haYe
to be over 32,000 bilateral tax treaties to coYer every
possible cross-border transaction. The U.S. would

36
Ruth Mason, U.S. Tax Treaty Potier and the European Court of Justice,
59 NY Tax L. Re,·. 65,70-71 (2005) (discussing avoidance of double taxation).
37
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have to enter into new treaties \vjth ove1· 160 countries
to ensure that its co,·erage spanned the globe.38
The United States could attempt to establish tax treaties with
each and every remaining country, a time-consuming task, or the United
States could develop tax treaties with groups of associated countries.
Indeed, this method would conserve time and promote world trade
among the United States and the foreign countries with which it already
does business. Although tax treaties exist between the United States
and most member countries of the European Union, the utility of
cross border transfer price recognition treaties with European Union
members is suspect. For example, the European Court of Justice ruled
that the French goyernment was not required to grant a cross-border
trans fer price cred.it to one of its citizens who earned income in Germany;
therefore, Germany and France both taxed the citizen's transaction. 39
"Following such an adverse ruling... the ~Iember States presumably
would pressure the Urured States to remove the offending provisions
from their tax treaties." 40 Unless the United States accommodates
the European Union and its members by establishing multilateral
tax treaties covering the European Uruun as a whole, transfer pricing
penalties in absence of such treaties will suppress global economic
prosperity. Although a multilateral tax treaty with the European Union
was discussed, this is merely one type of tax treaty the U.S. Government
must strive to establish with foreign unions and individual countries
in order to ensure that multinational corporations are taxed fairly.

VI.

CoNCLUSION

Transfer pricing in today's global economy is a controversial
subject that continues to be a source of litigation in the United States tax
38
Allison D. Christians, Tax Treaties for lswcstment and Aid to SubSaharan Africa: A CASE STUDY, 71 13rook.lyn I,. Re" 639, 659 (2005) (fax
Treaties yet to be established).
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39
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court. No'v multinational companies have little hope of circumventing
the transfer pricing tax code, whereas before the L990s ta..x reform,
multinational companies utilized transfer pricing schemes in order to
transfer taxable income to countries where the corporate income tax
rate was much lower, and complicated topics in the domain of tax law
due to its enigmatic nature. Before d1e 1990s tax reform, legislation
allowed multinational companies to calculate their own transfer prices
for transactions bet\veen paren t comp~lnies and foreign subsidiaries.
But "\\'ith the advent of progressive tax laws, muJtjnational companies
must now assign a reasonable estimate to all transferred assets.
Furthermore, transfer prices for intangible assets must be derived
from a number of valuation metl1ods: both assets must be in the same
industry, both must haYe a similar profit margin, or both must be used
in the same general process. Because of this evolution in the tax code,
the IRS is fighting anJ winnjng many transfer pricing cases as these
multinational companies continue to stretch the tax code to its limits.
The IRS's most recent ta..x case against Glaxo Smith Kline
highlights the pragmatic nature of the United States' tax code
against multinational companies that infringe transfer pricing ta..x
law. Yet even as it punishes tax-deYiams, tax legislation must deal
with multinational companies fairly and a,·oid submitting them to
double-taxation by neglecting to form tax treaties. By coordinating
with foreign governments to establish in which country, and under
what conilitions, a multinational ·will pay back taxes and penalties
for transfer pricing infringements. The United States must continue
to form tax treaties witl1 countries individually or in groups in order
to regulate transfer prices and all the while eliminating doubletaxation. As tax evasion strategies of multinational companies in
the United States evoke, the tax code must adapt with transfer
pricing legislation to establish equality for global commerce
among multinational companies and their respectiYe governments.
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